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ABSTRACT
Increased standardization of goods was a by-product of the technical innovations
triggering the Industrial Revolution. A side eﬀect of standardization was the new
abilities it allowed for theft and embezzlement. Two signiﬁcant modern insti-
tutions radically evolved during the 18th to mid 19th centuries to control these
costs: criminal law and public police. These institutions strongly interacted with
the pace of the Industrial Revolution. Our argument explains this evolution, and
helps to explain several historical facts: the role of early police; the fall of the
watch system; the removal of possession immunity; the rise and fall of factory
colonies; the fall and rise of court cases during the 18th century; and the delay of
per capita income in response to technical innovations in the Industrial Revolu-
tion.
∗ Simon Fraser University and the University of Washington. We thank Bob Ellickson, Doug
Hay, David Jacks, Levis Kochin, Frank Lorne, Joel Mokyr, Clyde Reed, and Rick Szostak for their
comments.1. Introduction
The startling number is 544 — the number of years that passed between the
Statute of Winchester in 1285, which established private policing of criminal activity
in England, and the Metropolitan Police Act in 1829, which created a public police
force in London. Public police did not arise ex nihilo, they were the capstone
of a hundred years of criminal law reform and experiments with various forms of
quasi-public policing eﬀorts. Figure 1 highlights the time line of events. Over the
span of 600 years the ﬁnal emergence of public police appears relatively sudden.
However, the institutional changes were gradual. Signiﬁcant changes to criminal
law began in the early part of the 18th century as Parliament dealt with increases
in property theft rates. Early types of police also emerged by the mid-18th century,
as do early forms of factories. But it was an evolution. It would take almost 100
years for criminal law and public police to take on a form we would recognize today
as modern.
We examine the transition from private to public police, and from civil to crimi-
nal law, in light of the movement towards standardized goods.1 Standardized goods
were the signature of the Industrial Revolution, and yet these goods were often
mismatched with earlier legal institutions that were designed for more idiosyncratic
commodities.2 We argue that the growth of criminal law and the emergence of pub-
lic police are tied together by the emergence of uniform, standardized goods that
1 Each of these evolutions has been documented elsewhere. Here we trace the changes, but our
contribution is to provide an explanation of the change at a fundamental level: standardization.
Thus we provide an eﬃciency explanation for the institutional transition. This contrasts sharply
with the social historical interpretation that views the changes in law, ﬁrms, and police as successful
eﬀorts of the wealthy to usurp the traditional customary rights of the working poor and enforce
social control based on bourgeoisie values. See Linebaugh (2003) or Becker (1983), as examples. It
also contrasts with the older Whiggish historical view (eg Radzinowicz (1948), which viewed the
arrival of the police as a “logical” and “rational” progression towards a modern world.
2 Although we argue the Industrial Revolution led to previously unparalleled increases in stan-
dardization, this does not imply standardized goods did not exist previously. For example, loans
had long been standardized and subject to anonymous exchange and court enforcement. Indeed,
money was always relatively standardized.developed during the Industrial Revolution. Our thesis is that as standardization
developed, the gains from anonymous exchanges increased; however, along with
these gains the losses due to theft and embezzlement increased, and the evolving
law and police were responses to this.3
Figure 1
Although we do not formally test our model, we do use it to explain several
historical observations of the period. First, we showthat our hypothesis is consistent
with the activities of the new police. Second, we explain how the emergence of
public police is consistent with the decline of the watch and ward system of private
policing. Third, we explain the switch in rights of possession for goods held by
agents and employees. Fourth, our argument is also consistent with the fall of
civil litigation throughout the 18th century. Rather than interpreting this to a
rise in civility, it is seen as a result of the inability to civilly prosecute crimes
related to standardized goods. Fifth, we explain the the evolution of the factory.
Industrialists initially responded to increased embezzlement by operating in isolated
“factory colonies” which employed workers in a form of voluntary servitude. The
creation of public police and the expansion of criminal law, however, altered the
constraints faced by factory owners and facilitated their move to the modern forms
of organization — the large scale urban centered factory. Finally, we provide a
plausible mechanism for explaining how various technical and other innovations
3 Legally embezzlement refers to an employee appropriating money or goods received by him on
account of the employer. We use the term more generally to refer to any theft by employees. We
use the term “theft” for items stolen between strangers.
–2–could have led to the growth in per capita income associated with the Industrial
Revolution and why this growth was “delayed.” Technical innovations, improved
transport and trade, and increased specialization (which economic historians have
shown are inadequate to explain the income growth) all increased standardization,
which eﬀected the entire economy through growth in anonymous exchanges. Thus,
our argument suggests the Industrial Revolution would have been more modest
had the creation of the modern police and the growth of criminal law not occurred
along with the mechanical innovations. Without the appropriate legal institutions
to support it, the Industrial Revolution would have been conﬁned to the isolated
factories in the countryside that emerged in the 18th century and continued to
operate until the legal changes matured.
2. Standardization
In its pre-modern era, before the turn of the 19th century, Britain was a coun-
try laced with odd and old institutions like venal oﬃce holdings, dueling, public
patronage, and private criminal investigation.4 One might ask: what critical event
triggered our modern institutions? Why was the organization of life so diﬀerent in
1750 compared to 1850, but hardly diﬀerent between 1850 and our present day?
The short answer: the declining role of variability.
Variability in the quality of goods has two sources: natural and man-made.
Variability can be reduced by aggregating commodities, by sorting into diﬀerent
classes, or guaranteeing that a good will meet some level of performance. It can
also be reduced by using more homogeneous inputs, better tools, careful monitoring,
and measurement of quality. However, the need to take such actions results from
variability that arises in nature. Large variances caused by nature often raise the
4 As were other countries in pre-modern Europe. We focus on Britain because the industrial
revolution had its origins there. Mokyr (2007, p. 26), in a similar spirit to us, claims that Britain
had a series of institutions which fostered investment in human and social capital investment which
lead to their leading the way industrially. See Allen (2005) for a discussion of four of these pre-
modern institutions.
–3–cost of human eﬀorts to reduce variability. Prior to the Industrial Revolution,
everything in life involved a large natural component — variance was everywhere,
and this led to high variability in product quality.
Large roles played by variability meant there were large opportunities for cap-
ture. If a load of wares headed for a distant market could be lost at sea or lost
to pirates, it could easily be lost to opportunistic agents. Such problems were well
known, and the pre-modern institutions were the means by which these problems
were dealt with. The Industrial Revolution began to change the degree to which
variability interfered in life. For the ﬁrst time it became possible to leave nature
outside the production process. Not perfectly, of course; indeed, by modern stan-
dards perhaps not very well at all. However, variability was reduced enough to
allow suﬃcient measurement at a reasonable cost, and reliable replication; that is,
the beginning of standardization. Standardization is an important element of the
Industrial Revolution because it is the key to understanding the source of modern
institutions.
2.1. Measurement Costs, Theft, and Embezzlement
Standardization reduces the costs of measurement for the purpose of identifying
the attributes of a product, and as a result, lowers the costs of exchanging these
commodities through formal contracts. Contracts, enforced by the state, are used
for well-measured commodities, especially when standardized. Thus, standardiza-
tion has enormous value, and opens the door for large gains from anonymous market
exchange.5 Improved uniformity allows the use of large levels of physical capital in
the form of machines, which in turn create even smaller variances in output. Stan-
dardization allows ﬁrms to alter their marketing methods, and changes the way they
organize their workforce. Without standardization goods are more diﬃcult to mea-
sure, and may often be evaluated subjectively. Under these conditions exchanges
5 Greif (2006) generally argues that the emergence of widespread anonymous exchange is one of
the key factors of modern growth.
–4–will tend to be enforced informally through reputations. Disputes regarding such
agreements must be resolved directly by the parties to the agreements, as the courts
are unlikely to know what the parties agreed to.6
However, standardization brings with it new problems. With standardization
new opportunities for theft arise because the very feature of standardization that
lowers the costs of exchange through markets and contracts, also lowers the cost of
fencing stolen goods and increases the costs of protecting goods from theft — in-
cluding theft by employees. Standardization lowers the cost of fencing stolen goods
for thieves because the thief selling a standardized good can transact anonymously
and reduce his exposure. Standardized goods make those fencing and purchas-
ing stolen goods less vulnerable to being caught. The opposite holds for artisan
goods. Thieves selling artisan goods must use their reputation to get a good price.
This requires them to identify themselves, increasing the chance of being caught.
Furthermore, intermediaries and ﬁnal consumers of stolen goods are more at risk
dealing with artisan goods that could be identiﬁed at any time by their legitimate
owner.
The reciprocal side to this is that legal owners of standardized goods have no
advantage in discovering, investigating, or prosecuting theft. There are several
reasons for this. First, uniform quality of goods slightly hinders the owner from
discovering a theft, but drastically hinders him from investigating it. Second, when
the transportation costs of standardized goods are low and their markets wide,
owners are hindered because they have little knowledge of far away markets. Third,
preventing the theft of standardized goods is a public good, at least in part. Any
private eﬀort to reduce theft and black market sales of standard goods provides a
beneﬁt to all owners of standardized goods, thus leading to an under provision of
their private protection.
6 For example, when a buyer who transacted by contract the purchase of 10 lb bags of sugar
claims that the sugar is not up to speciﬁcations and the seller disagrees, the courts are reasonably
able to adjudicate the dispute. On the other hand, when a buyer who commissioned a painting is
displeased about its quality, he is unlikely to be helped by the courts and his only recourse is to
tarnish the painter’s reputation. See Barzel (2004) for a discussion.
–5–Contrast this with the protection and theft of artisan goods. Non-standard,
artisan goods are often identiﬁed with their owner, and certainly are likely to be
identiﬁed by their owner. That is, the owner has a comparative advantage in identi-
ﬁcation. This would hold true for both intermediate and ﬁnished goods. Thus, the
legal owner of artisan goods will tend to be the eﬃcient “protector/investigator”
of the goods. Artisan owners are familiar with their goods, have asymmetric infor-
mation over their legal status, are best able to determine when and what has been
stolen, and are best able to recognize their goods when in the possession of others.
These factors make them the eﬃcient owners of the protection rights of the good.
This comparative advantage of the artisan owner is enhanced when the markets for
these goods are more local due to high transportation costs.7
One implication of the theft problem caused by standardization relates to the
legal status of “possession.” Since owners of standardized goods are unable to iden-
tify one specimen from another, and thus unable to identify goods sold legitimately
or stolen, possession will tend to be synonymous with legal ownership. That is,
if someone is in possession of a standardized good, he will be the presumed legal
owner. The opposite is true about an artisan good. Someone in possession and
claiming ownership of a nonstandard good will be required to have some type of
proof of ownership beyond mere possession. This may be in the form of a title, reg-
istration, receipt, or perhaps local speciﬁc knowledge of ownership. In the case of an
artisan good a legal owner is able to identify a specimen, stolen or not, even though
the specimen is in the possession of someone else. For artisan goods ownership and
possession can be easily separated.
7 Consider, for example, an extreme case of an artisan good : children. When a child is missing,
the parent is the ﬁrst to know. Likewise, seeing one’s child in the unauthorized possession of another
adult is suﬃcient for the parent to know a theft has taken place. Parents, quite naturally, are still the
primary “police” of their children because they have a strong comparative advantage in protection,
and because the value of their children to others is generally low. Third parties require much more
information to identify a given stolen child, and only become involved after the eﬀorts of parents
are unsuccessful, or when the parents request their services.
–6–2.2. The Industrial Revolution Increased Standardization
The unprecedented levels of 19thcentury income had its beginnings a century
earlier. The eﬀect of 18th century technical innovations, both the great and the
practical, on economic growth and social behavior has been analyzed at length.8
That there was a change in the rate of growth of output between 1760–1840 no one
questions. Quite apart from the actual volume of production, another fundamental
feature of the IndustrialRevolution was the dramaticincrease in the standardization
of output and inputs of manufacture.9
Technological improvements had been ongoing for a long time prior to the In-
dustrial Revolution. However, until the late 18th and early 19th century, the role of
variability had been so large in every productive process that it had been impossible
for diﬀerent workers to produce identical goods. Starting with the source and con-
trol of power, energy came from humans, animals, wind, or water. These natural
sources were seasonal and varied considerably across space. Tools of measurement
were often crude, and the hand tools mostly used led to a very artisan form of pro-
duction and non-uniformity in ﬁnal output. Given the high costs of transportation,
inputs were often local and varied from one jurisdiction to another, leading to wide
ranging variation in output. No refrigeration, no dependable transportation, and
often no reliable means of knowing where you were — especially at sea — meant
that everything about life involved enormous elements of chance. Production super-
vision was minimal and small scale, leading to less specialization and less uniform
products. Heaton notes the variability in the production of a simple product like
yarn before the Industrial Revolution:
It is well nigh impossible to secure uniformity of yarn. The clothier asked for a
deﬁnite standard when giving out the wool to be spun, but the tendency would
be for each house and each spinner to vary a little in the thickness and ﬁrmness of
8 See Mokyr extensive editor’s introduction (1999) for an excellent modern survey.
9 Though the topic is generally ignored, Szostak (1991) has an excellent and extensive discussion
of standardization during the Industrial Revolution.
–7–the yarn; some sent in hard-twisted, others soft-twisted, and it was very diﬃcult
to reduce the work to one standard.
[p. 335, 1965]
The same could be said of virtually all production prior to 1700: standardization
was uncommon.10
Throughoutthe 18th century and early partof the IndustrialRevolution a steady
stream of new tools were developed that allowed standardization even in industries
where artisan workmanship prevailed. Berg discusses how improvements in stamp-
ing technology, though not designed for mass-production, improved the ability to
manufacture uniform goods in engineering, cutlery, and hardware.11 As the In-
dustrial Revolution progressed, the creation of steam power, continuous supplies of
coal, and new methods of production meant that some industries could free them-
selves from the rhythm of natural power sources. Increased travel and road safety
meant markets became bigger, supplies more regular, and inputs more consistent
across long distances. Thus, the increased division of labor, the increased use of
machines, the use of non-seasonal sources of power, the better roads and use of
standard inputs, all led to increased standardization of products throughout the
Industrial Revolution.12 At the same time that the types of goods available and
their average quality increased, the quality variance decreased.
Szostak (1991) makes a compelling case that standardization was related to
improvements in road and water transportation that increased market size and the
10 High volume of production and standardization seem to be complementary. Mokyr (1999, p.
106) notes that “Standardization and uniformity demanded a special kind of quality control, which
required continuous supervision and thus factories.” Langlois (1996) also notes that large volumes
make investments in jigs and dies worthwhile, and these contribute to standardization.
11 Berg, pp. 269-270, 1994. Rosenberg (1963) provides a detailed discussion of the machine tool
industry and how the development of special milling machines, turret lathes, and other instruments
led to precision in manufacture.
12 In reference to iron Szostak states “...one of the major advantages of puddling and rolling was
that it was capable of producing a homogeneous output...” (p. 127, 1991). He also documents
changes in weaving, bleaching, and supplies of clay, that led to increases in the standardization of
clothing, nails, and dishes.
–8–method of distribution, and that it was initiated not by technological changes alone.
Better transportation led to more standardized goods, which allowed goods to be
marketed and sold anonymously or by third parties. Early in the 18th century sales
by contract were uncommon and manufacturers traveled with their artisan wares to
sell directly to buyers. By the end of the 18th century a national network of common
carriers had developed that allowed producers to sell at a distance by sample and
by taking orders.13 This increased sale of goods at farther distances required stan-
dardization.14 Thus, the initial and subsequent forces of standardization reinforced
each other and accelerated the trend.
However, the arrival of standardization amid pre-modern institutions created
new theft problems.15 Old institutions designed to deal with large roles of variability
were often no longer appropriate for standardized goods because standardization
allowed workers and thieves new opportunities for embezzlement and theft, while
at the same time hindering property owners from protecting their goods. We argue
that two major institutions were responses to the increased costs of identifying
stolen goods brought about by increased standardization. First, standardization led
to changes in the law with respect to the deﬁnition of crime and personal freedom.
Past practices that had not been criminal, were made so, and punishments and
13 Szostak pp. 13–15, 168–169.
14 Elsewhere Szostak states:
Of special importance here is the need for standardization. Selling goods face to
face does not require a standardized product; selling by sample does. In order to
take advantage of new and better methods of distribution, then, it was necessary
to produce a standardized product.
[p. 355, 1989]
15 Szostak (1989) brieﬂy discusses the role transport had on embezzlement. “As the number of
materials increases, the cost of detecting foul play by inspecting the ﬁnal good rises sharply. Thus
the relative advantage of factories in this regard became increasingly important. Workers were not
only watched while working, but could be, and were, searched when leaving. Direct supervision
of employees in a centralized workplace would become increasingly attractive as the number of
materials being dealt with increased.” (pp. 354-355).
–9–the form of punishment changed. Second, standardization led to the formation of
public police forces.
3. The Evolution of Criminal Law
What constitutes a “crime” is a matter of state deﬁnition. Prior to the Indus-
trial Revolution oﬀenses were generally civil matters. An individual violating the
property rights of another would most often be privately arrested, broughtto a court
to be privately prosecuted before a judge who owned the court oﬃces, and if found
guilty would generally pay restitution and court expenses. This system of torts,
dating back before the Norman invasion, slowly and steadily evolved as many torts
became classiﬁed as crimes against the King, punishable by either a ﬁne, beating,
possibly incarceration, transportation, or death. This evolution signiﬁcantly accel-
erated throughout the 18th century — especially with respect to property crimes.
The state increased its ability to search and arrest, oﬀenses which had historically
been torts began to be classiﬁed as crimes, and the number of capital oﬀenses in-
creased.16
3.1. Examples of Criminal Law Evolution
The practice of gleaning is an example of the 18th century evolution of a legal
practice (which if excessive could be tortious) becoming criminal. In the early
18th century it was common and lawful for workers to glean scrap material from
production.17 These scraps could be assembled and resold, or sold as inputs to
someone else. These gleanings were considered perquisites, and were acceptable to
16 This transformation has been thoroughly documented by Becker (1983) in the context of em-
bezzlement statutes, and by Fletcher (1976) in the context of larceny.
17 For example:
The mates of the West Indianmen had a right to the sweepings of sugar and coﬀee
from the hold of the ship; the gangsmen and coopers established a claim to the
drainings of molasses and split sugar on the ﬂoor of the warehouse; .... At the
Royal Yards, the shipwrights were allowed to take for ﬁrewood the chips that fell
from the axe ....
–1 0–employers.18 If an employer felt the gleaning was carried too far their only remedy
was to sue for damages in a civil trial for breach of trust. As the century wore on,
these practices were deﬁned as crimes and made illegal.19
In the 18th century the legal status of gleaning evolved into pilfering or embez-
zling and might be called “clicking,” “bugging,” “scraping,” “chippings,” “vails,”
“sweepings,” or even “cabbage” with the particular term depending on what indus-
try was being referred to. These names often appear as the titles to legislation that
criminalized the behavior.20 The Clicking Act of 1723 allowed a magistrate or agent
to search the premises of a leather shoe-making journeyman who was suspected of
clicking.21 The Bugging Act of 1749 criminalized the practice of substituting in-
expensive fur for beaver pelts in hat making, and introduced prison punishments
for the crime. This and the Worsted Act of 1771, further increased the powers
[Ashton, p. 208, 1966]
The practice of gleaning extended beyond the employment relation. Between lord and peasant there
were gleaning rights to grazing (Common of Pasture), hay after harvest (Common of Shack), wood
from forests (Common of Estover), and peat and turf (Common of Tubary) to name a few (Ditton, p.
40 1977). These rights were removed and made illegal (wood theft, poaching, trespass, etc) through
the enclosure acts.
18 Wage packages composed partly by moral hazard payments are ineﬃcient compared to a ﬁrst
best scheme. If manufacturers could have reduced the gleanings at no cost, both real wages and
gains to the manufacturer would have increased.
19 For example, Hay (1980) notes:
... groups of workers entered the criminal court records through activities which
suddenly became illegal. ... One form this took was a prolonged campaign, ... to
rationalize wage payment. The motive was to eliminate traditional perquisites,
that part of the raw materials or ﬁnished product claimed by the worker as part
of the wage. Perquisites, although sanctioned by long custom, were therefore in-
creasingly redeﬁned, in many trades, as theft. Parliament enacted a large number
of embezzlement statutes in the course of the century, to allow easier prosecution
of workers taking materials, and justices and juries enforced them.
[pp. 70–71, 1980]
See Phillips (pp. 188–189, 1977) for a similar discussion.
20 According to Soderlund (p. 647, 1998), fourteen acts covering ﬁfteen industries were enacted
during the 18th century to deal with the conversion of gleaning to embezzlement.
21 As Linebaugh (p. 234, 2003) puts it, although a historical practice, “clicking was criminalized.”
–1 1–of search and made “ordinary tasks of the labour process such as sweeping out
the room, snipping weft ends ... potentially criminal oﬀences.”22 These acts were
designed to “put an end to the customarily acknowledged appropriations of work-
ers.”23 The Truck Act of 1831 outlawed payment of wages in goods rather than
cash. Indeed, Becker (pp. 1499–1500, 1983) discusses eight diﬀerent embezzlement
statutes related to the woolen industry alone that extended criminal sanctions to
what had earlier simply been normal practice or the civil wrong of breach of trust.
Gleaning was not the only criminalized action. Prior to 1692 it was not a crime
to possess stolen goods.24 Throughout the 18th century penalties were increased
for “receivers” of stolen goods, and in 1827 possession of stolen property became a
felony. Until 1799 it was the civil wrong of breach of trust, not a criminal oﬀense
for a servant to “convert to his own use money for goods received from a third
person for his master.”25 Indeed, by the early 19th century most embezzlement
was prosecuted criminally as larceny. This avoided the complication of gleaning
issues and matters of trust between masters and servants.26 By 1855, the Crimi-
nal Justice Act allowed a summary trial of indictable thefts of small value, which
22 Linebaugh, p. 268, 2003. Elsewhere he points out that “The Bugging Act, like the Clicking Act
preceding it or the Watch Scraping Acts following it, was designed to put an end to the customarily
acknowledged appropriations of workers who had not yet been fully alienated from the means and
materials of production.” (p. 239, 2003).
23 Linebaugh, p. 239, 2003.
24 Phillips, p. 221, 1977.
25 Phillips, p. 225, 1977. Phillips goes on to note how the creation of the factory assisted in this
changing relationship:
...the development of the industrial system and the concentration in factories and
workshops simpliﬁed the legal position on ownership and theft of raw material;
there was no longer the legal problem which outwork posed, that while the own-
ership of the raw material remained with the master, the possession was with the
outworker. Once all the material was worked up within the factory or workshop,
this legal confusion disappeared.
[p. 189, 1977]
26 Phillips, p. 225, 1977.
–1 2–further extended the prosecution of embezzlement which was often of small indi-
vidual values.27 Styles notes that during the 18th century the burden of proof was
often shifted to the accused, and that this resulted from the diﬃculty of identifying
embezzled materials.28
3.2. Criminal Law and Standardization
The natural question to ask is: why would historical practices be made criminal
in the 18th and early 19th centuries, and why would civil wrongs be converted to
crime? Our answer is that the evolution of criminal law is the consequence of
the emergence of standardized goods. Goods that had always been standardized,
like currency, had always had their theft criminalized.29 Goods that had always
been artisan had their disputes remain in the civil courts. Rather, it was the
standardization of the ordinary products of life that led to the changes in criminal
law. Considerthe question of gleaning. The practice of gleaningplaces somefraction
of goods in the public domain, to be captured by workers. Historically, workers
were limited in their ability to glean too much by the owners ability to identify
stolen merchandise. Once inputs and outputs became standardized throughout
the early Industrial Revolution, however, stolen goods become easier to fence and
the costs of gleaning increased considerably. Thus Randall (p. 193, 1990) states
“Embezzlement was rife in the manufacturing industries of eighteenth– and early
nineteenth–century England.”30 At the same time, the ability of employers and
owners to privately investigate and prosecute the theft of standardized goods fell.
27 Becker (p. 1487, 1983) also notes that Parliament eliminated the grounds of proving discovered
materials were actually stolen. This further allowed property owners to attack the practice of
embezzlement.
28 Styles, p. 195, 1983a.
29 Though coins could be clipped and counterfeited, they were relatively standard.
30 He documents the rise in complaints to Parliament between 1750 and 1840, and notes that
this rise was not correlated with economic growth (p. 201, 1990). He estimates that in the woolen
industry embezzlement amounted to about 2% of the ﬁnished cloths value (p. 201, 1990).
–1 3–Black markets increased, and a owners were unable to civilly litigate due to the
failure in identiﬁcation.31
In earlier centuries stolen goods were idiosyncratic. Since the legal owner was
the low cost identiﬁer of these goods, the task of retrieving them was assigned to
him, and the civil procedures allowed for restitution to compensate.32 The early
changes to the law increased the legal authority of the few existing public oﬃcials
(constables, justices of the peace, watchmen) to intervene in the form of searches
and arrests.33
31 Embezzlers would sell purloined goods to networks of black market dealers, known in the wool
industry as “slingers.” Randall notes the problem introduced by standardized goods.
Prosecution of the slingers, however, was more diﬃcult since proof of ownership
could not always easily be established. This had been a principal complaint of the
clothiers to the 1774 committee. Cooper told them “that he had in searching of
suspected persons’ houses, found a large quantity of wool and yarn of various sorts,
diﬀerent colours, diﬀerent wools, and in many small quantities, and not being able
to swear to the identity of any of it, the persons could not be prosecuted.
[p. 207, 1990]
32 Again, Randall provides an example in the woolen industry.
Occasionally it was possible for the victim of embezzlement to provide watertight
evidence of fraud. Thus the wool bought from John Pobjoy by Thomas Blackburn,
a small Bradford on Avon clothier, was readily recognized by its owner, John
cooper, as wool stolen from his slubbing shop because it was a peculiar German
wool, ﬁner than was common, and used by no other clothier in Trowbridge.
p. 208, 1990]
33 In addition to the acts counted as crimes, the 18th and 19th centuries saw enormous changes
to the nature of criminal punishment. Prior to this, conviction resulted mostly in restitution. The
introduction of “crime” led to the removal of criminals from society. The Black Act essentially
made all crimes capital oﬀenses. By the turn of the 19th century many of these were reduced to
either transportation, or more likely, incarceration. After 1841 executions were carried out only for
murder. [Phillips, p. 47, 1977.] It is beyond this paper to develop a separate theory of the form of
punishment. However, the general issue is a Coasean one: is it better to build a wall around the
criminal or the victim? With public enforcement of criminal law, the former is optimal. Criminal
prosecution means that the thief must be removed from society, either through death, transportation,
or incarceration. To allow them to remain at large would mean individuals would have to privately
protect themselves without recourse to restitution.
–1 4–4. The Emergence of Public Police
Until the 19th century policing in England was mostly privately provided. There
was a steady decline in violent oﬀenses from the middle ages on, and so the emer-
gence of the public police in England in the ﬁrst half of the 19th century was not in
response to a sudden increase, or continuinghigh levels, in violent crime.34 Our con-
jecture is that the rise of police resulted from two factors induced by specialization.
First, increased criminal law increased the demand for public police. With crimes,
those found guilty were punished or ﬁned, with the ﬁne going to the treasury. A
crime requires the investigation and prosecution by a public oﬃcial because the ab-
sence of restitution and the public good nature of enforcement removed the major
incentives for the private investigation and prosecution of a theft.35 Second, the
34 England in the 13th century was a rather violent country. Malcolm estimates that the homicide
rate was 18-23 per 100,000 population, and that violent deaths accounted for 18.2% of all criminal
indictments. (Malcolm p. 21, 2002.) However, the trend in violence from this period until World War
I is steadily downward. By the 17th century homicide rates had fallen by half, and this continued
throughout the 18th century until by 1890 “only three people in all of England and Wales were
sentenced to death for murder committed with a revolver.” Malcolm p. 91, 2002. Malcolm notes
that although all of this was done in the context of private provision of police and justice:
Violent crimes continued their steady, indeed dramatic, decline in the [late 16th
to 18th centuries] ... by the third quarter of the eighteenth century the convicted
murder rate for London and Middlesex was on average only four a year. And as
the eighteenth century drew to a close, foreign visitors traveling through England
commented on its very low level of violent crime.
[Malcolm, p. 80]
This is conﬁrmed as well by Beattie (1974) who analyzed indictments in Surrey and Sussex from
1660 to 1800 and concluded that violent crime rates generally fell throughout the century, while
property crimes rose (p. 61, 1974). However, as discussed in the previous section, he recognizes
that the rise in property crime was inﬂuenced by the changing deﬁnition of crime. Hay (1982) ﬁnds
similar results.
35 Styles (1983b) provides an interesting examination of one aspect of criminal investigation that
involves a public good: the dissemination of information on the incidence and character of oﬀences.
The 18th century saw an “information explosion” in the form of advertisements, newspapers, and
handbills to replace the ancient hue and cry. Despite this, private eﬀorts at criminal prevention and
prosecution did not exploit the new technology. Styles points to four information problems with
private investigation: criminals could easily “escape discovery by ﬂight” (p. 132), local magistrates
were “profound[ly] ignoran[t] ... of places and people ... in distant parts of the country” (p. 133),
–1 5–reduced ability of private individuals to deal with the theft of standardized private
property led to a demand for public police.
4.1. From Private to Public Police
Prior to the 19th century there was no public police force as we know them
today, and investigation, arrest, and prosecution were primarily the responsibility
of private individuals, aided by owners of venal oﬃces in the local court.36 Hay and
Snyder note how these oﬃcials contrasted with the future police:
...both constabulary and watch were far more dependent on the justices for di-
rection than the new police were to be, and that activities were usually limited
to patrolling and assisting private citizens in the immediate apprehension of of-
fenders. The enforcement of the law, in the sense of bringing oﬀenders before
the courts and convicting them there, depended primarily on the activities of the
bench, and of the private prosecutor.
[Hay and Snyder, p. 16, 1989]
Preventing crime was not exclusively an act of individual private citizens. Larger
ﬁrms employed security guards and organized their ﬁrms to prevent theft. Groups
within a community would form prosecution associations, hire private police patrols
and investigative services, and use systems of rewards for capture. These private
eﬀorts dealt with the entire spectrum of criminal activity.37
ﬁnding informationwas expensive and inconvenient, and there was no “oﬃcial facilityfordistributing
information” (p. 134). It was not until the publicly funded magistrate, John Fielding of the Bow
Street oﬃce, instituted his General Preventative Plan in 1772 that any attempt to forward criminal
information was made. When his funding was cut, the practice was not taken up again until later
in the next century.
36 There were no public servants in the pre-modern era. Court oﬃcials owned their oﬃce and
charged fees for service. Two court oﬃcials would have been a constable and sheriﬀ. Hay and Snyder
state: “In England in the eighteenth century apprehension was the task of the victim of crime, aided
(where he could get such help) from a parish constable or town watchman.” [ p. 18, 1989] For a
discussion of the evolution of public service, see Allen (2005).
37 For example:
Thus not only assaults, but virtually all thefts a n de v e ns o m em u r d e r sw e r el e f t
to the general public. That meant that responsibility for the initial expense and
entire conduct of the prosecution was thrown on the victim or his or her family.
[emphasis added]
–1 6–The public police did not arise out of a public vacuum, however.38 There were
parish constables, watchmen, and justices of the peace. These were quasi-public
oﬃces, which assisted private individuals, and in the 18th century it often fell on
them to enforce the growing number of criminaloﬀences. Over the course of the 18th
century eﬀorts were made to enhance these positions or ﬁnd complementary means
to assist in their police function. For example, the 1777 Worsted Act allowed an
employers’ association to organize an industrial police force which could “regulate
virtually every aspect of the production process. But their chief function was to
detect and prosecute acts of embezzlement.”39 In addition, for a period in the 1760s
London magistrates were paid out of Treasury funds to investigate crimes. The
Bow street magistrates oﬃce formalized this into a force known as the “Bow Street
Runners,” often considered London’s ﬁrst professional constables. Though similar
in function to private police and theif-takers, they were paid by the magistrate with
government funds. Although not well funded towards the end of the century, the
oﬃce kept criminal records and made public horse patrols to guard London roads.40
The system of private enforcement of law was clearly second best.41 Although it
lasted for centuries, it slowly evolved into a public system. Public police forces were
[Hay and Snyder, p. 23, 1989]
Private crime prevention was often organized around horse thieves: “A number of the early societies
were aimed speciﬁcally against horse thieves — horses being very valuable property which were easy
to steal and easy to move away quickly.” [Philips, p. 125, 1989]
38 See Jones (1983) for a discussion of early forms of police.
39 Soderlund, p. 647, 1998. Prior to the Worsted Act, various private organizations attempted
to police embezzlement. In Yorkshire, for example, a group formed a voluntary association in 1764
to reduce short and false reeling. The voluntary force was funded through subscriptions based on
enterprise size. Soderlund (p. 654, 1998) notes that “Despite its success, however, the Yorkshire
manufacturers’ undertaking remained vulnerable. In the end it failed, victim of inter-capitalist
rivalry ...”. By 1776 it was ﬁnished. Soderlund concludes (p. 661, 1998) by noting that “For several
decades the inspectors failed to fundamentally challenge the pattern of workplace appropriation
practiced by thousands of woolcombers and handloom weavers.”
40 Linebaugh, pp. 221–222, 2003.
41 Of course, a public police and prosecution hardly is ﬁrst best. Most notably police have less
personal incentive to solve crimes, and must be monitored. Because with police and public criminal
prosecution there is no retribution to the victim, the victim also has a reduced incentive to prevent
and prosecute. Starting with Becker and Stigler (1974), there have been several articles discussing
–1 7–created through several pieces of legislation: the Metropolitan Police Act (1829)
which established a paid police force in London; the Municipal Corporations Act
(1835) which required all incorporated boroughs to have a police force; the County
Police Acts (1839 and 1840), and the County and Brough Police Act (1856) which
ultimately required all jurisdictions to be publicly policed. By the end of the 19th
century, the system of public police, courts, and prosecutors had become completely
entrenched.
As Phillips points out, the transition was quite fast:
In 1835, there was no police force in the Black Country; in 1860, it possessed four
police forces with a total strength of 262. It had changed from being an ‘unpoliced
society’ — where police functions were carried out (if at all) by citizens or their
appointed constables, to a ‘policed society’ in which a paid police force operated.
[pp. 53–54, 1977]
After generations of no police, the transformation must have seemed revolutionary
to the people of the time. And yet the new institution, once introduced, was
accepted quickly. Indeed, the police existed on the “moral assent of most of the
population to the role of a police force as enforcer of law and order.”42
4.2. Standardization and the Police
We hypothesize that the creation of the police is a response to the increased
standardization of goods brought about by the Industrial Revolution. When com-
munities were isolated, local, and stolen goods artisan, such issues had been suﬃ-
ciently handled without police. As the Industrial Revolution progressed, the ability
of private individuals to investigate crimes declined because of their inability to
identify stolen standardized property.
the merits or shortcomings of a public police force. For example, Landes and Posner (1975) argue
that private enforcement is unlikely to be eﬃcient, while Friedman (1984, 1995) argues that a private
system can be eﬃcient. Our view is that, whereas both systems were second best, the private system,
eﬃcient in its time, was replaced by a public one when standardization became common.
42 Phillips, p. 54, 1977.
–1 8–Other factors also existed. First, there is the mere logistical problems of ﬁnding
oﬀenders. This problem was exacerbated with the improvement of roads in the 18th
century.43 Second, the long standing system of rewards provided an incentive to
stage oﬀenses or entrap others to commit them.44 However, had goods remained
artisan, the problems of traveling thieves and collusion to collect rewards could still
be managed by some type of private policing system. Standardization eliminated
the private sector’s comparative advantage in policing.
5. Historical Evidence
We’ve argued that standardization was a by-product of the industrialization.
Standardization changed the costs and beneﬁts of theft and protection and we’ve
argued this led to the evolution of public police and criminal law. Here we brieﬂy
discuss some evidence supporting our hypothesis.
5.1. Policing in the Black Country
If public police emerged to enforce the new criminallaw with respect to property
crimes, then the activities of the early police should reﬂect this.45 Detailed evidence
43 “... many property-owners had great diﬃculty ﬁnding and arresting oﬀenders against them in
the days before organized professional police forces — particularly if the oﬀenders had traveled any
distance from the scene of the crime.” [Philips, p. 117, 1989]
44 Consider the role played by bounty hunters called “thief-takers.” Paley (pp. 301-302, 1989)
tells the tale of two young men on trial for highway robbery. However, it turned out the two had
been enticed into the crime by a thief-taker and his partners who staged the robbery. The “victim”
identiﬁed the two, but before the reward could be collected the plot was uncovered. According to
Paley:
It is diﬃcult to escape the conclusion that the major eﬀect of the provision of
£40 rewards was to provide an incentive not to the detection of crime but to
the organization of thief-making conspiracies. ... The result was that thief-takers
were in business not to detect crime but to commit it.
[Paley, p. 323, 1989]
45 Consistent with this hypothesis is the emergence of police in Japan. Prior to the industrial
revolution, Japan had no public police. With the industrial revolution standardized goods from
–1 9–of what types of activities parish constables and the new police were up to is not
readily available. However, Phillips (1977) provides such a detailed account in his
examination of virtually all indictable oﬀenses brought to trial between the years
1835–1860 in an area known as the “Black Country.”46 The Black Country, named
such because of the intense coal mining and iron works of the area, stretches across
100 square miles just northwest of Birmingham. It held a population of 211,323 in
1831, and grew to 473,946 by 1871.47 Phillip’s study begins before the introduction
of public police and prosecution, during the time when parish constables assisted
private individuals in the investigation and prosecution of crime. He generally ﬁnds
the constabulary eﬀective in dealing with crimes where the “victim either knew,
or had a fairly strong suspicion who the oﬀender was” (p. 60). On the other
hand he ﬁnds that parish constables were relatively ineﬃcient at “...ﬁnding the
perpetrators of crimes of which the victims could not name the oﬀenders ...” (p.
60). In the early days of the Black Country, Phillips states that most larcenies
were of the former type, and that “all the constable had to do in such cases was
take into custody the oﬀender caught red-handed, or search the belongings of the
suspected oﬀender and, if the stolen property was found, arrest him.” (p. 61).
Europe entered the country and a European style pubic police force was formed in 1874. According
to Aldous:
The Japanese word for ‘police’ – keisatsu – was coined at the beginning of the
Meiji period (1867–1912). The need for ‘the new nomenclature’ and the novel
institution that it described – or anticipated – reveals as much about the situation
before the restoration as it does about the priorities of the new regime. According
to J.B. Leavell, ‘Tokugawa Japan was an unpoliced society.’
[p. 19, 1997]
Other non-European countries developed European police forces around the same time, but we
cannot distinguish whether these are in response to the nature of the goods or just a colonial
import. With Japan, the colonial explanation is absent.
46 In general there is evidence that the police were more involved with property crimes than violent
ones. As mentioned, violent crimes fell throughout this period. Crimes against property, however,
were increasing. Linebaugh, in his in depth study of criminals hanged in London during the 18th
century, states that most were hung for property crimes (p. XXII, 2003).
47 Phillips, p. 25, 1977.
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artisan character.48 Phillips concludes “the system continued to work until the
1840s without any serious breakdown of law and order in those communities which
relied on parish constables” (p. 62).
Criminal activity in the Black Country changed with the continued growth
of factories and larger mines. With the industrial growth came an increase in
“industrial theft.” Phillips reports that property crimes without violence accounted
for 85% of the indictable committals handled by the new police, and that 80% of
these cases were larceny. Industrial theft consisting of inputs like coal, iron, and
tools, was the most common, accounted for 28.2% of all committals. The second
highest category was theft of clothing, which accounted for 17.2% of committals.49
Of the industrial thefts, Phillip notes that the increase over time in this category
stemmed from “the expansion of large-scale capitalist mining and manufacturing
production” (p. 180) and that
This oﬀensive continued to gather momentum; over the period 1835–60, there
was a continual and marked increase in industrial theft prosecutions — in absolute
numbers, as a ratio per 100,000population, and as a percentage of all prosecutions
brought for any indictable oﬀence and of all larceny prosecutions brought.
[p. 189, 1977]
A major problem with industrial thefts and theft of clothing was the inability of
the original owners to identify their goods. Phillips notes that clothing was “easy
to get at, easy to carry away, and relatively diﬃcult for the owner to identify with
certainty” (p. 196, emphasis added).
5.2. The Watch and Ward System
48 Randall (p. 210, 1990) notes the same thing in the woolen industry. Local constables could
search the home of a spinner or weaver suspected of embezzlement, but were ineﬀective at dealing
with the network of black market dealers. This trade was only stopped with the introduction of
police.
49 Phillips p. 177, 1977.
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land was the Statute of Winchester, 1285.50 Among other things it created the
Watch and Ward system. The watch was made up of as many as 16 men who
patrolled and guarded the gates of walled towns during the night.51 All men of
the town were on the roster to volunteer their turn, and all were privately armed
to some extent. Their chief duty was to arrest strangers when ‘they ﬁnd cause for
suspicion’ and deliver the stranger to the parish constable in the morning. If a
stranger resisted arrest, then a hue and cry was made and everyone in the town was
to assist in arrest. This system was in place until the end of the 18th century.
The watch was useful only to prevent theft of artisan goods. Prior to the Indus-
trial Revolution, when most goods were artisan, a watchman could eﬀectively police
theft because they could likely identify goods in the possession of strangers. How-
ever, with the coming of standardized goods (including the increased use of money
payments rather than truck) the watchman is relatively ineﬀective in identifying
stolen property. The watchman was a patrolman, on the look out for strangers or
strange activity. He was not an investigator or detective. With standardized goods
the watchmen, along with the walls they patrolled, ceased to be eﬀective and were
replaced by a professionalized police force.
5.3. Possession Immunity
Our model predicts that standardization changes the presumption of ownership
as related to possession. When goods are artisan, ownership is less likely to be
linked to possession because individuals are known to be matched with particular
assets. Although this may not help with the detection of crime it greatly simpliﬁes
proof of a crime since witnesses could persuasively testify that an object belonged to
a particular party. When goods become standardized, this is no longer possible, and
50 Critchley (p. 7, 1978) notes that it “... was the only general public measure of any consequence
enacted to regulate the policing of the county between the Norman Conquest and the Metropolitan
Police Act, 1829 ....”
51 These duties were called the “ward” when conducted in the daytime.
–2 2–possession becomes a signal of ownership. Throughout the 18th century, as goods
became more standardized, there were changes in the criminal law that reﬂected
this.
For example, a long-standing common-law doctrine in master-servant relations
was “possession immunity.” According to Fletcher this meant “transferring posses-
sion of an object conferred immunity from the criminal law on the party receiving
possession, for subsequent misuse or misappropriation of the entrusted object.”52
Possession immunity meant that a worker could receive possession of working ma-
terial, knowing that the owner could not lay criminal charges of theft. Possession
immunity formalized in law the fact that ownership could be separated from pos-
session in a time when goods were easily identiﬁed with their owner. Artisan goods
that were stolen or embezzled could be identiﬁed and recovered through civil ac-
tions. The embezzlement acts of Parliament of the 18th century removed immunity
in various industries and Parliament ﬁnally eliminated it in 1857.53 With stan-
dardized goods it is eﬃcient to have possession identiﬁed with ownership, but this
exacerbates the embezzlement problem with such goods, and thus it would make
no sense to maintain the immunity provision.54
With the elimination of possession immunity came other charges for possessing
stolen goods. Styles notes that this reﬂected the diﬃculty of identiﬁcation:
Another obstacle to detection was the diﬃculty of identifying embezzled materials.
The 1749 act, the 1774 wool act and the 1777 general act created a range of catch-
all oﬀences out of mere possession of suspicious materials. The burden of proof
was placed on the accused, reversing the normal relationship between prosecutor
and defendant in later-eighteenth-century English law.
[Styles p. 195, 1983a].
52 Fletcher, p. 472, 1976.
53 Fletcher, p. 483, 1976.
54 Consistent with our theory is the phrase “possession is nine tenths of the law.” According to
Garner (1995, p. 674) this layman’s phrase arose in the English setting between the 17th and 19th
centuries. Presumably, prior to this the popular notion of ownership did not immediately follow
from possession.
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Measuring the frequency of crime and civil disputes is never simple and doing so
in the 18th and 19th century is even more problematic. However, studies have been
done and some generalizations are possible. For example, Brook (1989) conducts
a comprehensive survey of civil litigation in England between 1640–1830 and ﬁnds
a dramatic fall in litigation in both the King’s Bench and court of Common Pleas
until the end of the 18th century, followed by an increase. Mokyr (2007) uses this
as evidence that trust was increasing among Englishmen during the period. He
notes that “Whether eighteenth century Britain was really becoming a kinder and
gentler place is a diﬃcult issue, but at least within the circles of commerce, ﬁnance
and manufacturing, trust relations and private settlement of disputes seem to have
prevailed over third party enforcement.”
This is a diﬃcult interpretation to reconcile with the increased legislation reg-
ulating thefts at places of employment and the steadily increasing amount of crime
o v e rt h es a m ep e r i o d . 55 We oﬀer an alternative explanation. The steady increase in
standardization meant that former civil law institutions were incapable of handling
the rise in property violations. Local constables and magistrates were less eﬀective,
and individual property owners less able to identify stolen goods. The result was
less use of the courts to prosecute “crimes” through civil courts. As the criminal
law was adapted, theft was dealt with through criminal courts and this is reﬂected
in the growth in criminal indictments.
5.5. The Transition of the Factory
As embezzlement increased over the 18th century, industry owners were left with
carrying the burden of enforcement and prosecution.56 Protection, however, has
55 There were no criminal statistics kept at this time. However, Beattie (1974) conducted an
enormous study of indictments in Surrey and Sussex over this time period and concludes that for
property crime there was “a gentle rise over the course of the [18th] century.”
56 According to Becker (p. 1511, 1983), “Manufacturers formed associations, entered into sub-
scriptions, and hired inspectors.”
–2 4–a public good element, and though attempts to privately organize it were made,
these coalitions were unstable, and Parliamentary testimony suggests they were
ineﬀective.57 Private eﬀorts to lower general theft and embezzlement problems often
only help one’s competitors, and as a result there was always an incentive to free
ride on private enforcement of investigations that had public beneﬁts. Consequently,
as the gains from specialization were increasing and driving capitalists to bringing
workers more and more together, a private response was required to deal with the
immediate rise in theft and embezzlement.
Prior to the Industrial Revolution most production took place in family oper-
ated cottage industries. When larger volumes of output were required, work was
“put-out” to independent sub-contractors. Products produced in these cottage in-
dustries and the inputs used to make them were artisan in nature.58 Embezzlement
and various types of shirking were common because payments were made through
gleaning and truck.59 Payment in kind, when the payments are in terms of raw
materials, made it diﬃcult to avoid embezzlement of these materials at the margin.
Ashton puts it this way: “In each case the workers saw to it that the crumbs from
the masters table were ample. Casks were handled not too gently; sacks were liable
to burst open.... The line of demarcation between the extension of established rights
57 See Becker pp. 1509-1512.
58 Ashton describes it:
... in many industries the boundaries of the ﬁrm were ill-deﬁned, the structure
loosely organized, and the workers remote from the center of control. In the tex-
tile trades, in particular, there must have been thousands of workers who never
set eyes on their employer. The notion that the coming factories meant a ‘deper-
sonalisation’ of relations in industry is the reverse of the truth.
[pp. 102–103, 1966]
59 Linebaugh, in the context of silk production, states “These customs, latitudes or cheats arose
either between the merchant and the master to whom the silk was put out for work, or between the
master and his workers. Allowance was made for waste, or negotiated in either case. The techniques
of production appeared to be highly wasteful.” (p. 264, 2003). See also Styles (p. 179, 1983a).
–2 5–and barefaced robbery is diﬃcult to draw” (p. 208, 1966). Given the artisan nature
of goods prior to the Industrial Revolution, these embezzlements were likely small.
As the advantage of large scale economies increased, and as goods became
more standardized, the already existing problem of embezzlement increased dra-
matically.60 A major part of this problem was that factory authorities had no
jurisdiction outside their yard, and as a result resale markets could ﬂourish. That
lack of jurisdiction represented a major problem for the factory system.
Further evidence for this is found in the testimony of manufacturers who lobbied
throughout the 18th century for criminal sanctions against the truck system.61 Long
run solutions would need to be found, but the ﬁrst large ﬁrms did not have the
luxury of using later institutional resolutions. The immediate, radical, solution was
to create “factory colonies.” In a factory colony workers and their families move
to an isolated part of the countryside where they could work and live together.62
This exploited the beneﬁts of the factory system, while containing the problem of
60 Whether in textiles, cutlery, needle production, ironwork or nails, “in some of England’s major
industries, the embezzlement of raw materials was a serious and growing problem.” (Jones, p. 131,
1982). Knight discusses this problem in the context of a naval shipyard during the American War
of Independence.
The next diﬃculty was to prove the stores were in fact the Kings, and also that
they had not been legally bought at a dockyard sale of old stores. Cordage made
for the King was to have a white thread ... canvas had a “blue streak,” and
all metal goods had the broad arrow stamped on to them. However, these marks
could easily be remove; ... Brine employed a copper-smith in pickling and cleaning
coppersheets, two blacksmiths in beating out the broad arrow mark from bolts
and the yard foundry for ﬁling the mark from brass pieces.
[p. 221, 1975]
61 See Becker (1983, pp. 1510–1511) for a discussion.
62 A factory colony was not possible for the Navy. Instead they attempted to deal with the
problem in other ways. For example, the navy began selling scrap wood directly and used the funds
to supplement wages. In 1767 the British Navy earned £100,000 doing this, “twice the cost of the
wage increase” (Dobson, p. 99, 1980). The navy also denied wives (who could steal material under
garments) permission to come on site to collect chips and deliver food to the workers. Finally, by
1805 the practice of chips [gleaning] was completely eliminated.
–2 6–embezzlement.63
For example, consider cotton factories, which are among the ﬁrst associated with
the Industrial Revolution. Though these and other factories eventually dominated
the industrial cities of England, the ﬁrst factories were located in remote isolated
parts of the country.64 For example, the Burrs Mill, established in 1801 in Bury,
was nine miles north of Manchester; the Styal Mill built by Samuel Greg in 1784
was in a location “with a very scanty population.”65 Isolated, the owners of these
private communities erected houses, shops, churches, schools, and other amenities
for their workers.66 Fitton and Wadsworth emphasize the private nature of these
63 We distinguish between merely bringing groups of independent workers together to minimize
transport costs, and operating a factory where workers were controlled. Berg documents how many
artisan groups worked under a single roof in “workshops” or “proto-factories,” but the true factories
were ones that controlled worker behavior to prevent embezzlement:
Both systems of production — artisan and capitalist — could, therefore, generate
centralized production ... But ... factory systems ... clearly diﬀered in their
social relations of production. ... factories [were] founded ... with the stated
purpose of greater supervision, quality control and prevention of embezzlement.
Contemporaries were clearly aware of a big distinction between the two types of
establishment.
[p. 226, 1994]
Others have also noted the role of the factory in solving theft problems. For example, see Williamson
(1980).
64 Collier, in her detailed study of several early factories notes: “The factory system ﬁrst made its
appearance not in the large towns where it later became concentrated, but in the country districts.”
(p. 14, 1964). Fitton and Wadsworth note (p. 106, 1968) that the locations of many of the surviving
buildings of these early factories are still remote.
65 Collier, p. 39, 1964.
66 Chapman notes how common this was:
... experience soon showed that big wage packets were not the only solution,
particularly where it was necessary to attract workers to isolated mill sites. At
Cromford, Arkwright found it necessary to oﬀer employment to whole families,
and to build houses before they could be induced to move from Nottingham, Derby
or Manchester. By 1790 he was providing a public house, a weekly market and
garden allotments to retain his work-force. The Strutts at Belper, David Dale at
New Lanark, the Evanses at Darley Abbey, the Gregs at Styal, and other factory
colony builders had to oﬀer comparable incentives ...
[p. 55, 1972]
–2 7–towns:
They were, it is easy to forget today, a deliberate creation, without assistance
from the State or local authority and with no public services. The factory, the
weirs and dams, the machine-shop, the roads and bridges, the inn, the truck-shop,
the church and chapel, the managers mansion all were devised by and grew up
under the owners eye.
[p. 98, 1968]
Within these communities there was friction among both skilled and unskilled
workers, not just over long shifts and wages, but also over the “insistence on close
and continuous supervision of work by overseers.”67 Wages in the mill were gener-
ally higher than agricultural wages, but the workers surrendered a certain amount
of civil liberties to work there. Known as “factory discipline,” behavior within and
outside the mill was monitored. Workers would sign contracts which committed
them to work at the factory for several years.68 Failure to stay could lead to boun-
ties advertised in local papers, and to prosecution. Factory owners also instituted
local forms of justice in the form of ﬁnes or “forfeits.” In the Strutt Mills these
were issued for such oﬀenses as “absence from work without leave,” “destruction of
mill property,” “failure to do work as required” (the largest category), “misconduct
outside working hours,” and “theft of mill property.” In Fitton and Wadsworth re-
porting of these forfeits (p. 234), the theft category includes “stealing packethread;
having waste found on body; stealing candles, yarn, rolers, nails, pincers, etc.; and
making good yarn into waste and pockiting (sic) it.” In some sense, the factory
colony was like a voluntary prison. Workers accepted the higher wages in exchange
for a reduction in their civil liberties which reduced their ability to embezzle the
ﬁrm.69
67 Chapman, p. 54, 1972. Szostak notes that “The individual factory labourer was almost always
supervised by someone ... supervision of production workers by foreman and capitalists, developed
simultaneously with the shift to factories.” (pp. 343-344).
68 Huberman (p. 29, 1996) states that apprentice contracts in the colonies were for 7 years. See
also Fitton and Wadsworth (p. 233, 1968).
69 Gregory Clark points out that “A puzzling aspect of factory discipline was that instead of
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be no evidence money was made on community development. Factory owners had
no special cost advantages in building schools and churches. Indeed, “they found
that the establishment of a new community was an expensive and often frustrating
experience, and labour turnover continued at a very high rate.”70 We venture
that the gain must have been in the ability to supervise workers and prevent the
sale of property stolen from the factory.71 The remote locations, the monitoring
of behavior outside of working hours, the supply of shops and the removal away
from open markets, all would have reduced the ability and beneﬁts of individuals
within the ﬁrm to steal. These drastic measures were necessary because the factory
system gave workers access to large supplies of standardized inputs and outputs.
Once beyond the factory gates, possession of the standardized good would have
amounted to de facto ownership. Without modern institutions to prevent theft,
isolation was the best method of protection.72 As eﬀective as this must have been
in reducing theft, the costs would have been enormous. These costs represent a
rewarding workers according to their output, it used behavior of workers as a measure of perfor-
mance.” (p. 132, 1994). He concludes that ﬁrms had to act as a social coordinating device because
workers lacked self control when they had personal freedom. Our interpretation is that the loss of
civil liberties and ease of interacting with outsiders was a constraint on employee theft.
70 Chapman, p. 55, 1972. Collier notes: “It seems hardly credible, however, that a ﬁrm of the
dimensions of Peel, Yates and Peel in 1801-1802 would trouble itself with the minute details of retail
shop keeping, solely because of the proﬁt that could be made.” (p. 30, 1964).
71 Jones notes that:
There seems to be a general consensus amongst both contemporaries and histori-
ans that the adulteration and embezzlement of raw materials constituted a major
problem during England’s Industrial Revolution. ... by the nineteenth century a
regular trade had developed in embezzled yarn.
[p.129, 1982]
72 Large enterprises had occasionally existed prior to the Industrial Revolution and the arrival of
the factory: the silver mines of Laurium in ancient Greece; the Roman silver mines in Rio Tinto,
Spain; or the tremendous latifundia landed estates of the Roman Empire. All of these were run
using slaves, prisoners, and indentured servants. Our interpretation is that this type of labor force
prevented the workers from stealing the precious metals and other valuable goods.
–2 9–minimum measure of the gains from the new organization of production and the
eventual advantage of moving to cities. As a result of these costs, this colony form
of organization was relatively sparse and short lived. By the middle of the 19th
century urban manufacturing had begun to dominate.73
From 1820 to the 1860s the factory moved back to the city — a move that
coincides with the emergence of police. The critical diﬀerece between the urban
factory and its colony predecessor, was their organization. Long-term contracts and
indentured apprentices were gone, labor generally became less skilled and less family
related, and the entire colonial community disappeared. Large plants were more
likely to pay their workers in money than in kind. In particular, the paternalism
shown by the colonies had started to wane:
... the scale and intensity of the textile masters involvement in the patronage of
philanthropy and culture changed widely from the 1840s. ... Elsewhere the change
came later. ... In all this, the factory owner was no longer conﬁned to the role of
patriarch superintending the welfare of his immediate band of workers ...
[Howe, p. 272, 1984]
Technical changes increased the optimal scale of the factory as well as the num-
ber of low skilled workers required. To continue the colony system under the larger
scale, and given the emergence of the police, simply proved too costly.74 At the same
time, increased mechanical production was creating more and more standardized
outputs, which, as argued, increased embezzlement opportunities.
What allowed the factory to move back to the city, however, was the presence
of a public police force that could investigate and reduce theft outside the factory
gates. With the changes to the criminal law, the police could crack down on public
markets where stolen property could be resold. Laws on search, the criminalization
of gleaning, and cash payments over truck all helped to reduce theft problems at
work and facilitate the modern urban factory to come into existence.
73 Chapman, p. 57, 1972. Collier states “The factory system ﬁrst made its appearance not in the
large towns where it later became concentrated, but in the country districts.” (p. 14. 1964).
74 Huberman: “For many ﬁrms the apprenticeship system proved costly to maintain, and by the
turn of the [19th] century it was breaking down.
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Starting somewhere in the late 18th century something dramatic happened: per
capita income began to increase. The increase was so small — just less than 1%
per annum — that major economic ﬁgures would miss it for over 150 years. Still,
it continued until by 1860 per capita income in England had doubled, along with
a doubling of the population. Such an event had never happened before in history,
and of course, the real growth in per capita income was about to explode even more.
Economic historians have struggled to explain this growth in per capita income
we now call the Industrial Revolution. McCloskey (1994) demonstrates the slow
take oﬀ in growth, but also argues that traditional explanations fail to explain
it. He summarizes that “industrialisation was not a matter of foreign trade, not
a matter of internal reallocation, not of transport innovation, not investment in
factories, not education, not science.” (p. 253, 1994). Crafts and Harley (1992, p.
705) put it this way: “it seems impossible to sustain the view that British growth
leapt spectacularly in one generation as a result of innovations in manufacturing.”
The fundamental problem is that any given industry is just too small to ac-
count for changes in aggregate growth. This has led many economic historians to
look for “feedbacks” or “dynamic” eﬀects to account for the Industrial Revolution.
McCloskey (p. 269, 1994) suggests that “free speech and an openness to persuasion
leads to riches.” Mokyr (2007) argues that growing trust and social capital lead
to leadership and growth. Finally Clark (2007) provides a Darwinian argument
that the Englishman of the 18th century had survived a selection process and ended
up with strong middle class values of thrift and industry, which allowed for the
Industrial Revolution.
Standardization provides another plausible and complementary explanation for
the Industrial Revolution. As we’ve argued, standardization led to an enhanced role
for criminal law and the eventual emergence of the police. These two institutional
–3 1–developments eﬃciently mitigated the problems of property theft and embezzle-
ment. Moreover, the presence of police further encourages innovations that lead to
more standardization. Standardization in general, unlike any speciﬁc innovation,
eﬀected the economy as a whole, and the institutional solutions to the theft problem
had similar widespread eﬀects. Thus, although the factory no doubt created enor-
mous gains from complementaries in investments, supervision, and quality control
(Geraghty 2007), these beneﬁts could not be fully exploited until the full arrival of
criminal law and public police.
6. Conclusion
The institutional changes that took place between 1750 and 1850 are remark-
able, and they separate our modern world from its pre-modern predecessor.75 The
evolution of criminal law, the arrival of public police, and the transformation of the
modern factory, though not alone, all stand as examples of this transition. Histori-
ans have often viewed the pre-modern era as one of graft and corruption, and that
the modern era embodies “progress” on the institutional front. But the Englishmen
of 1700 were just as interested in wealth as their descendants 200 years later, and
their actions and choices were just as rational. Thus, the institutions they designed
have just as much economic logic as do modern ones.
75 It is also what separates the developed from the undeveloped world. Gabre-Madhin (2001)
provides a fascinating report on Ethiopian grain trade, and argues that a lack of standardization
is a major contributor to poverty among Ethiopian grain farmers. She describes markets that are
remarkably similar to English markets prior to the Industrial Revolution:
...grain is highly diﬀerentiated because there is no formal standardization and
classiﬁcation system, contracts are oral and nonstandardized, grain shipments are
not inspected or certiﬁed oﬃcially, and there are very limited means of legally
enforcing contracts (Dadi, Negassa, and Franzel 1992; Kuawab Business Consul-
tants 1994). These constraints cause grain traders to be highly vulnerable to being
cheated with respect to market prices, quality and quantity of the delivered grain,
and other contractual terms such as the timing of delivery and grain spoilage or
loss during transport ...
[p. 36–37, 2001]
–3 2–Though others have documented the changes in criminal law, police, and facto-
ries, we have provided a theory for their simultaneous evolution. Our claim is that
the standardization of goods led to increases in theft opportunities, and that our
modern institutions are the response to this reality. The ability to control theft and
embezzlement, while still accommodating the increased standardization, allowed in-
dustry to expand. This contributed to the eventual growth in per capita incomes
that resulted from the technical changes in the Industrial Revolution.76 Had the
18th century institutions remained in place, the Industrial Revolution would have
been severely hampered, and perhaps restricted to isolated factory colonies.
76 Our study parallels North’s (1968) classic study on the sources of productivity growth in ocean
shipping. He found that the conquest of piracy in the Atlantic was more important than technical
changes and best explains the expansion of shipping trade from 1600–1850.
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